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OVERNMENT regulation of the private sector has long been a source ofG considerable controversy in American politics. The problems of regulation~-~ have concerned not only businessmen, politicians, and consumers, but econ-
omists and political scientists as well. The growth of the consumer movement as
a force in national politics has added a new impetus to demands that &dquo;something&dquo;
be done about regulation. Deciding what to do about regulation is not easy, how-
ever, either in terms of the conceptual issues involved or in terms of prescriptions
for change. Although economists have devoted considerable attention to analyzing
regulation and suggesting reforms, George Stigler’ has noted that they are often
willing to make policy recommendations without sufficient knowledge of the impact
of such recommendations. Their guidance, therefore, has been far from infallible.
Political scientists have not been as persistently attentive to the problems of regula-
tion with the notable exceptions of Lowi, McConnell, and Edelman.2 These schol-
ars focused on the major political problems associated with regulation. One of the
more important of these political problems, according to McConnell, is the relation-
ship between public and private power.
In the regulatory context the problem of private versus public power may be
seen as one of designating the beneficiaries of regulation, that is, who is regulation
intended to benefit, and who does it benefit? Are the powers of the state applied
to benefit select groups (the regulated industries) by protecting them from the
rigors of competition, or are such powers exercised to maintain conditions as similar
as possible to those of the free market and thus (in the view of economists) benefit
a larger public, specifically consumers? While the question of who actually benefits
is not fully settled,3 the dominant perspective holds that regulation has been for the
benefit of the regulated and not for the consuming public. Critics who perceive
this as a distortion of public policy goals attribute this outcome to the domination
of regulatory agencies by the regulated interests. In short, what McCraw4 calls the
&dquo;capture&dquo; thesis of regulatory behavior grips the imagination of many who have
analyzed regulatory activity. In the &dquo;capture&dquo; thesis, regulatory agencies are per-
ceived as systematically favoring the regulated industries and systematically ignor-
ing a larger &dquo;public interest.&dquo; Public agencies are seen as tools for the advancement
of private groups. The &dquo;capture&dquo; thesis reached its most complete expression in
Marver Bernstein’s book Regulating Business by Independent Regulatory Com-
NOTE : An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1976 annual meeting of the Mid-
west Political Science Association, April 29 - May 1, 1976, Pick Congress Hotel, Chicago,
Illinois.
1 George J. Stigler, The Citizen and the State: Essays on Regulation (Chicago: Chicago Uni-
versity Press, 1975).
2 Theodore J. Lowi, The End of Liberalism (New York: Norton, 1969) ; Grant McConnell,
Private Power and American Democracy (New York: Knopf, 1966) ; Murray Edelman,
The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964).
3 See: Stigler, The Citizen and the State; and Richard E. Posner, "Theories of Economic
Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, Autumn, 1974.
4 Thomas K. McCraw, "Regulation in America: A Review Article," Business History Review
49 (Summer 1975). 159-83.
5 See Louis Kohlmeier, The Regulators (New York: Harper and Row, 1969) ; Edward F.
Cox et al., "The Nader Report" on the Federal Trade Commission (New York: Gross-
man, 1969); and Robert Fellmeth, The Interstate Commerce Omission (New York:
Grossman, 1970).
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mission.6 Since then the idea of regulatory agency capture has become conventional
wisdom in political science, and has done so without any serious empirical exam-
ination. This paper hopes to remedy that omission. We demonstrate that Bern-
stein’s theory with some additional arguments is empirically testable and then test
the theory with a limited data set. We take this approach because we believe that
such simplistic solutions to regulatory problems as abolishing regulatory agencies
are neither feasible nor perhaps desirable. Regulatory agencies, in contrast to the
assumptions made by most economists, were not established to allocate resources
efficiently but were established to remedy other problems.7 7 If regulation entails
some deleterious second-order consequences or is not effectively performing its
assigned tasks, then the first step in reform is not the abolition of the regulatory
agencies but an examination of the reasons for failure.
THE LIFE CYCLE OF REGULATORY AGENCIES
The most popular explanation of regulatory agency failure was first summa-
rized and presented by Marver Bernstein. Bernstein contends that all independent
regulatory agencies follow the same historical pattern. This pattern is metaphor-
ically equivalent to a human life cycle with four phases: gestation, youth, maturity,
and old age.
1. Gestation
The climate which leads to the creation of a regulatory agency is filled with
strong political forces. Powerful groups press their demands for some corrective
action to remedy a policy or market failure. Opposed to the public demands are a
narrower group of interests whose behavior would be regulated. The struggle cul-
minates in the passage of remedial legislation and the creation of a regulatory
agency.8
2. Youth
From the legislative battle the new regulatory agency rises confident of public
support and eager to wage war on the problem. The agency pursues its goals force-
fully, concerned more with the interests of those responsible for creating the agency
than with the interests of the regulated. Downs9 contends such aggressive policy-
making Is characteristic of most new agencies. The personnel attracted to the
agency likely include many who pressed for the creation of the agency and, there-
fore, are Downsian zealots. Since new agencies have greater potential for growth
and greater possibilities for aggrandizing personal power, agency employment will
include younger, more ambitious, and possibly better trained personnel.
During the agency’s youth changes occur in the environment of the agency
that will eventually curtail its activism. Public support for the agency falters be-
cause the public has a short attention span and is diverted to other issues, because
the public believes regulation automatically follows legislation, and because the
public feels the battle is over. Actual regulation, unlike the fight to create an
agency, is diflicult to keep in the public eye. Establishing freight rates for cotton
between Sioux City and Birmingham is not a salient issue to most people. With
6 Marver H. Bernstein, Regulating Business by Independent Commission (Princeton: Prince-
ton University Press, 1955).
7 Paul Sabatier, "Social Movements and Regulatory Agencies," Policy Sciences 6 (1976), 301-
42 argues that many regulatory agencies were created to equalize group inputs, to maxi-
mize industry service, or to establish fair rates rather than to efficiently allocate resources.
8 The reasons for creating a regulatory agency are important; they are political reasons con-
cerned with market system failures or public policy failures. Rarely is the demand for a
regulatory agency presented as an efficient allocation of scarce resources although the
opposition to the agency may take this form.
9 Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967).
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the decline in diffuse support come changes in specific support for the agency.
Congressional interest in the agency drops, and the President loses interest because
the agency is &dquo;independent&dquo; of his control. Since this decline in specific and diffuse
support is not matched by a decline in specific opposition by the regulated interests,
the environment creates pressures counter to vigorous regulation.
3. Maturity
The environmental change that occurs in the agency’s youth leads to Bern-
stein’s third stage in the life cycle, maturity. The agency must try to survive in a
hostile environment where Congress, the President, and the public do not care and
the organized interests (e.g., the regulated) would like to eliminate the agency. As
Long10 eloquently argues, the organization must seek new sources of support to
maintain its power base and insure its survival. The most obvious source of such
support is the regulated industry since the agency’s actions are of low salience to
almost everyone else. The agency and the interest gradually arrive at a mutually
compatible agreement whereby the agency lessens its regulatory vigor and protects
the industry from competition while the industry supports the agency in its political
struggles for resources with the other political branches of government.
The maturity stage - what is normally defined as regulatory failure --- is
characterized by the following:
(a) Technical specialists (lawyers, economists, substantive specialists)
come to dominate the agency. Each group is able to veto or at least stifle
the other’s policy proposals creating a dependence on precedent.
(b) The agency falls further and further behind in its workload as the
result of the reliance on precedent and judicialized procedures. Backlogs
tend to drive out policy planning. The agency looks backwards at what
has been done rather than forward at what needs to be done.
(c) Congress and the President are indifferent to the agency workload
problems; in fact, the presence of backlogs and the perceived interrelation-
ship with the regulated influence the Congress and the President to deny
to the agency the resources it needs to operate. The result is reduced ap-
propriations and a cycle of budgetary decline.
(d) The above factors increase the agency’s identification with the in-
terests of the regulated, often creating interdependence to the degree that
the agency will recruit its personnel from the regulated industry. The
industry also becomes a more frequent place for old regulators to retire.ll
The result of all these factors is what can be termed organizational rigidity.
The agency through its interrelationships with the industry, its judicialized pro-
cedures, its professional squabbles, and its resource decline will be unable or unwill-
ing to respond to new pressures from the environment. The agency will continue
past policies which may or may not benefit the regulated despite the need for
innovative policy making. Rigidity occurs at the result of the mutual capture of
agency and interest which results from changes in the political environment of the
agency.
4. Old Age
The situation in old age for a regulatory agency is simply more of maturity
only worse. The agency’s personnel age and become even less aggressive, the re-
lationships solidify, and the industry and the agency attempt to create an environ-
ment in which both can live though not necessarily prosper.
10 Norton Long, The Polity (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1962).
11 See Roger G. Noll, Reforming Regulation: An Evaluation of The Ash Council Proposals
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1971).
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THE THEORY: SOME COMMENTS
Bernstein’s theory of regulatory agency decay is intuitively attractive and at
least superficially appears to fit with political reality. Huntington’s12 analysis of the
Interstate Commerce Commission revealed the initial aggressiveness and the even-
tual decline of the ICC. The Nader13 studies of the regulatory agencies never tire of
establishing strong ties between the regulator and the regulated. The newer regu-
latory agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency indeed appear more
vigorous than older ones such as the Federal Communications Commission.
Despite its appeal the theory has several limitations. First, Bernstein applies
the theory only to independent regulatory commissions. If environmental change
leads to rigidity, the environmental demands on Departmental regulatory com-
missions (Food and Drug Administration, Occupational Safety and Health Ad-
ministration, Packers and Stockyards Administration, etc.) will create similar
pressures to reach an accommodation with the regulated industry. Simply because
an agency resides within a department does not mean it is immune to the pressures
of its environment. 14 Second, Bernstein has not specified any time span for the
decay of regulatory agencies. Without some indication as to the length of the life
cycle, the theory will be difficult to falsify if youth is prolonged or shortened. Third,
Bernstein notes that the aging process occurs at varying rates in different agencies.
If this is true, using the theory of Downs and others, we would postulate that the
rate of aging is related to several environmental variables such as political support,
interest group strength, and complexity of the policy area. Examining these rela-
tionships is important because they may inform us as to how the process can be de-
layed if it cannot be prevented. Fourth, some agencies according to Sabatier were
meant to be captured. Agencies such as the Federal Communications Commission,
the Atomic Energy Commission and the Civil Aeronautics Board were established
at the request of the regulated interest to protect them from the uncertainties of the
environment. The life cycle theory may be inappropriate for agencies designed to
protect rather than regulate. Fifth, if the aging cycle occurs at varying rates and
is the result of environmental pressures, is it not possible to revitalize an agency by
manipulating its environment? If the environmental constraints are identified, the
options for remedial policy-making are extended far beyond the simple abolish or
leave things as they are options that are presented. Since some agencies (e.g., the
current FTC) show signs of revitalization, the life cycle argument is too pessimistic
and does not fully deal with regulatory agency change. Sixth, the theory portrays
agencies as passive actors at the whim of the environment. Rourke, however, has
demonstrated that agencies not only respond to environmental demands but often
shape the environment’s demands on the agency. If this is true, creative agency
leadership provides possibilities for preventing decay by creating an environment
more amenable to vigorous regulation.
A MODEL OF AGENCY DECAY
From the theory of Bernstein supplemented by the insights of Downs, Rourke,
Long, and others we can extract the important variables in the &dquo;life cycle&dquo; of regu-
latory agencies and construct a model. The first variable in the model is the age of
the agency. Age within the bounds of this theory is chronological age rather than
12 Samuel P. Huntington, "The Marasmus of the ICC," Yale Law Journal 61 (April 1952):
467-509.
13 See Cox, "The Nader Report"; Fellmeth, The Interstate Commerce Omission; Mark J.
Green, The Monopoly Makers (New York: Grossman. 1973); James S. Turner. The
Chemical Feast (New York: Grossman, 1970).
14 Francis Rourke, Bureaucracy, Politics, and Public Policy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976);
Downs, Inside Bureaucracy.
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a more complex multidimensional concept such as maturity. 15 The second variable
is the quality of specific political support for the agency in terms of other political
elites and the balance between general and regulated interests. The third variable
is the relationship of the agency to the regulated industry which may vary from one
extreme of capture to the other extreme of total independence. The fourth and
final variable is the degree of rigidity - the ability of the agency to respond to
demands placed on it by the environment.
FIGURE 1. THE AGENCY &dquo;RIGIDITY CYCLE&dquo; MODEL
With some limiting assumptions the four variables can be combined as a model
as shown in Figure 1.16 Age is the key variable; it affects the degree of political
support and through political support has an impact on interest relationships and
through both variables an impact on rigidity. Age, in theory, has only an indirect
impact on rigidity and interest relationships. Political support affects the agency’s
interest relationships and through interest relationships the rigidity of the agency.
The relationships of the agency to the regulated directly impact on the rigidity of
the agency. The reader should be aware that several other relationships that the
theory does not specifically note (denoted with dotted lines) are possible.
From the model presented and the more detailed theory of regulatory agency
decay six general hypotheses are suggested:
H1: The greater the age of the regulatory agency, the greater the rigidity
of the agency.
H2 : The greater the age of the regulatory agency, the more likely it is to
be &dquo;captured&dquo; by the regulated interest.
H3: The greater the age of the agency, the lower the diffuse support for
the agency.
H, : The smaller the political support for the agency, the greater the
probability of clientele capture.
H5: The smaller the agency’s political support, the greater the probability
of rigidity.
Hn: The stronger the interdependent relationship between the regulated
and the regulator, the more rigid the agency is.
15 Randall B. Ripley and Grace A. Franklin. Policy-Making in the Federal Executive Branch
(New York: Free Press, 1975).
16 Specifically the model assumes a linear recursive model. The aging process is, therefore,
irreversible within the assumptions of this model. 
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- . SOME MEASURES OF THE VARIABLES
Of all the variables used in this study, the easiest to measure and the least com-
plicated is the age of the agency. Age is measured as the chronological age of the
agency. Although this is contrary to Ripley and Franklin’s finding that agency
maturity is a multidimensional concept, the single operationalization is congruent
with Bernstein’s theory
Political support is a combination of three factors: congressional support,
presidential support, and public support. Congressional support, ideally, could be
measured in two ways - first, in terms of statements by individual members of
Congress concerning the agencies or their activities, or, second, in terms of the
behavior of Congress as a unit - allowing agency expenditure growth, decreased
limitation on personnel, and granting a large portion of the resources requested.
Our research will concentrate on the behavior of Congress overall rather than on
the opinions of individual members of Congress. Three indicators of congressional
support will be used, the budget growth rate allowed by Congress, the personnel
growth rate allowed by Congress, and the appropriations success rate.18
Presidential support can be measured by the growth rate of the executive bud-
get for each agency and by the quality of presidential appointments. Presidential
statements concerning regulation could also be used although we do not do this
for the same reason that we do not analyze the statements of members of Congress.
This reason is the dominant mythos surrounding the American view of regulation,
that is, that regulation is &dquo;bad.&dquo; It is easy to criticize regulation and is probably
good politics to do so. Clearly, if there were a direct correlation between what has
been said about the need for reforming regulation and what has actually been done
about reforming it, all of the problems of regulation would probably have been
solved long ago. We exempt statements, therefore, from this analysis and concen-
trate instead on what is actually done by Congress and the President. This analysis
will use only the growth rate of the President’s budget as an indicator of presiden-
tial support.19
Interest relationships (captivity) encompass the relationships between the
regulators and the regulated. Personnel processes provide two traditional indi-
cators of this variable - where entering personnel are recruited from (industry or
other) and where the personnel retire. The relationship with the interests regu-
lated can also be measured by a content analysis of group testimony before Con-
gress. Although such testimony is spotty for the older agencies in their initial years,
it does provide a rough indicator of group support.2° In addition, the use of con-
sent decrees rather than court cases indicates that the agency and the industry are
beginning to accommodate each other. A content analysis of agency decisions, an
onerous and tedious task, could show the change in relationships over time. Al-
17 The use of chronological age does not eliminate all the difficulties with the concept. The
decision as to when the agency was founded is not as simple as it seems. Many regulatory
agencies such as the FCC and the FAA had predecessor agencies and staffed themselves
from these predecessor agencies. We used the date the agency was created, not the date
of the predecessor agency. For the opposite view see Herbert Kaufman. Are Covern-
ment Organizations Immortal? (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1976).
18 The budget and personnel growth rates are calculated by dividing one fiscal year’s allotment
by the previous fiscal year’s, subtracting one and converting to a percent gain or loss.
The success rate is the percentage of the agency’s budget request that is granted by
Congress. All figures are from the Budget of the United States Government for the
appropriate fiscal years.
19 The interest support measure was constructed from a content analysis of group testimony
on the agency’s budget. Variables included direction (positive or negative) and specific-
ity (entire agency or program only). Coding details are available on request.
20 We have not included an indicator of general public support because diffuse public support
would be difficult if not impossible to measure since specific regulatory agencies are of
low salience to the average person. We do not know of any regulatory agency with a
reserve of diffuse public support,
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though these later behavioral variables are often useful in single agency case studies,
the behaviors are rarely comparable across agencies. We must limit our indicators,
therefore, to the personnel process and to testimony.
Several objective and partially reliable indicators of rigidity are also available.
Bernstein’s theory suggests that rigidity is reflected in increased backlogs, decline
in efficiency, drop off in expertise, and increased dominance by lawyers. Downs
adds the age of the administrators and increased turnover as manifestations of
rigidity.
The indicators for support, interest relationships, and rigidity have one major
advantage and one major disadvantage. The advantage is that all are available
from accessible sources to researchers willing to expend the effort. The disadvan-
tage is each indicator is a long way from a valid indicator of the variable in ques-
tion. For this reason any definitive attempt to assess the agency decay thesis will
need to use a multiple indicators approach. In addition to the indicator problems,
the type of analysis necessary to fully answer the questions raised must be longi-
tudinal (a few agencies over a long period of time) rather than cross sectional
(many agencies at the same time). Since Bernstein feels agencies age at different
rates, cross sectional analysis cannot provide a fully adequate test of the theory
because agency trends will be affected by different rates of aging. The theory can-
not be rejected if an older agency is less rigid than a younger agency.
In an attempt to evaluate portions of this theory, we gathered data on eight
regulatory agencies - the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), The Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB), the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA), and the Packers and Stockyard Administration
(PSA). The data gathered over the entire life span of the agency were taken from
federal budgets, the Government Organization Manual, Agency Annual Reports,
and standard biographical sources.
TESTING THE THEORY
This section will attempt several tests of the theory. Since the tests are done
with only a few indicators and a few agencies the results must be interpreted as
speculative rather than definitive. Our purpose is to examine the merits of the
theory within the limits of the present data sources. This procedure should permit
us to examine the utility of Bernstein’s theory as a description of reality.
l. Age and Political Support
If the theory of regulatory decay holds, hypothesis 3 predicts that age and
political support are inversely related. This implies that congressional and presi-
dential support for an agency will be strongest in the agency’s youth; in later years
the agency will have difficulty maintaining its budget base. Table 1 shows the
congressional appropriations growth rate for the eight regulatory agencies .21 Al-
though the correlations between agency age and its growth rate in Table 14 are all
negative, an examination of the data in Table 1 reveals Downs and Bernstein are
only partially correct. In the initial years of the agency, the agency grows rapidly,
exceeding the growth rate of the entire federal budget. After four to eight years
of growth, some decline and reversal sets in. After the initial decline the agency
experiences a great deal of fluctuation rather than continued decline in appropria-
21 Table 1 as well as Tables 2 through 13 present the data as four-year averages. The single
year figures are not reported because the data are too numerous to identify trends clearly
and because single years are often subject to random fluctuations. The correlations re-
ported in Table 14, however, use the year by year figures so that sufficient data points
would be available for analysis. Neither procedure affects the conclusions drawn.
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tions as the theory predicts. Table 2 (The Personnel Growth Rate) and Table 3
(The Presidential Growth Rate) plus the respective correlations in Table 14 show
a similar pattern.
TABLE 1. GROWTH RATE IN AGENCY APPROPRIATIONS PERMITTED BY CONGRESS
TABLE 2. GROWTH RATE IN AGENCY PERSONNEL PERMITTED BY CONGRESS S
Before evaluating hypothesis 3, two additional facts should be noted. First,
the reason why these agencies grow rapidly initially is that growth is easier to achieve
when the previous year’s budget is small. Any growth is a large percentage of the
base when the base is small. This pattern should appear in not only regulatory
agencies but all agencies of the federal government. Second, the pattern, despite
using four-year intervals,. fluctuates greatly. Some agencies fifty years old and more
are able to achieve annual budget growth rates of nearly 20 percent. Presidential
and congressional support does not disappear with age; it often grows. This con-
clusion is supported by the correlations between age and the various growth rates
for each agency (see Table l~) , The newer agencies, reflecting the initial down-
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turn, have the highest negative correlations. In the older agencies age is slightly
correlated in the predicted direction as a residual result of the first few years. When
these early years are deleted from the analysis, the relationship between age and
budget growth disappears.
Table 4 shows the budget success rate (percent of requested appropriations
that were granted) for the eight agencies. Since, as Fenno noted, success and growth
are independent, we are not surprised that no pattern appears. The success rate of
the NLRB and the FCC are the only ones (see Table 14) that show negative cor-
relations with age; in both agencies the relationship is unduly influenced by large
initial success rates. The other five agencies show positive correlations between
success in budgeting and age, contrary to the theory’s prediction.22
TABLE 3. GROWTH RATE IN AGENCY APPROPRIATIONS PERMITTED BY PRESIDENT
* Data not available.
The first four tables do not lend a great deal of support to Bernstein’s thesis.
Although growth rates are initially high and do decline, this is a normal pattern
that results when an agency is built out of nothing. Bernstein incorrectly general-
ized from the initial years of the agency and did not notice that regulatory agencies
often experience rapid periods of growth throughout their lives. Additional environ-
mental influences (e.g., the party controlling the White House and the Congress,
the existence of war, etc.) as they appear may be better explanatory variables than
just agency age.
2. Age and the Interest Relationship .
Hypothesis 2 predicts that a regulatory agency as it ages develops a more
positive relationship with the regulated industry. This hypothesis implies that
older agencies will recruit their personnel more from the regulated industry, will
have more of their personnel retire to the regulated, and the regulated’s expressed
support for the agency will increase as the agency moves into the industry’s orbit.
First, Table 5 reveals that recruiting agency personnel from the industry at
elite levels is a phenomenon that varies widely across agencies and across time with-
in agencies. Clearly Table 5 does not reveal regulatory agencies increasingly rely
22 It appears to the authors that success rates have improved generally in recent years. If this
is true it reverses a long standing role of Congress in cutting presidential requests. A
replication of Richard Fenno, The Power of the Purse (Boston: Little, Brown, 1962) is
in order to see if congressional behavior has changed.
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on the regulated for their personnel. In fact, the NLRB, the FAA, and the CAB
relied heavily on the regulated industry in their formative years. As these agencies
aged, they recruited more from the industry although they never relied exclusively
on the industry for most of their higher personnel. As the agencies aged further,
recruitment from the industry leveled off and actually declined. Table 5 shows re-
cruitment from the regulated industry is less frequent now than it was in the past.
Table 14 shows the wide range in the relationships between industry recruiting and
age; negative relationships were found for the NLRB, the FAA, and the CAB.
The positive relationships for the FCC and the FTC reflect the initial increase in
recruiting from the regulated but not the later decline. This test of Bernstein’s
hypothesis finds the theory lacking.
TABLE 4: PERCENT OF APPROPRIATION REQUESTED OF CONGRESS THAT IS RECEIVED
TABLE 5. PERCENT OF AGENCY ELITES RECRUITED FROM THE REGULATED INTEREST
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Second, members retiring to work in the regulated industrf3 is hardly uni-
versal, but occurs with sufficient frequency to cause concern. According to a 1959
congressional hearing on regulation, an average of 3.3 percent of retirees go to work
for the regulated industry.24 Table 6 shows elite retirement to the regulated is not
only infrequent but has decreased in recent years. Table 14 shows a negative cor-
relation (at times strongly negative) between age and industry retirement for four
of the agencies and no relationship for the FCC. Bernstein’s hypothesis of an in-
creasing trend is not found in the data.
TABLE 6. PERCENTAGE OF AGENCY ELITES WHO RETIRE TO THE REGULATED INDUSTRY
TABLE 7. THE DIRECTION OF INTEREST GROUP SUPPORT FOR THE AGENCY
~’ Data not available. 
,
23 The "regulated industry" is not an unambiguous term. Some cases are clear-cut such as
when a CAB employee goes to work for an airline. Other cases are not so clear. Many
retire to private law practice or consulting which serve primarily the regulated industry.
For the agency elites, we defined the term conservatively and did not include private law
practice or consulting where the business was not unambiguously one which served the
regulated.
24 United States Congress, House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Special
Subcommittee on Legislative Oversight, Independent Regulatory Commissions (Wash-
ington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960).
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Third, Table 7 (Industry Expressions of Support) adds little to confirming the
theory of regulatory agency decay. Table 14 shows support does grow with age but
that the correlations are very small. The positive correlations are more a function
of the increased tendency to testify before Congress rather than increased support
for the agency. Compared to other agencies, the expressed support for regulatory
agencies is very small exceeding that only of the Treasury Department and other
non-clientele agencies.
The findings concerning agency age and the interest relationship are clear.
None of the data unambiguously support the contention that regulators and the
industry form a more symbiotic relationship as time passes. In most cases the data
directly refute the hypothesis. The findings must be qualified since we have ex-
amined only personnel flows and public statements rather than agency behavior.
Pending a more comprehensive analysis, however, we must conclude that the agency
and the regulated do not become more interdependent over time.25
3. Age and Rigidity
Hypothesis 1 predicts that as a regulatory agency ages, its behavior will become
more rigid. Since the agency personnel are expected to decline in quality with age,
older regulatory agencies should have larger separation rates, less expertise, and
older leadership. Rigidity also includes judicialization of procedures; age, there-
fore, should be positively correlated with the percentage of employees that are
lawyers. Finally, age should be associated with increased backlogs and declines in
agency efficiency.
The turnover of agency executive personnel for our eight agencies is indepen-
dent of the age of the agency (Table 8). Table 14 reveals that the correlation
between the two variables is nearly zero in five of the seven agencies and negative
for another. Only OSHA fits the predicted pattern of increasing turnover. OSHA’s
pattern can be explained. Since OSHA is a relatively new agency that has become
controversial, the normal low turnover for a new agency has escalated rapidly.
With time OSHA will resemble the other regulatory agencies.
TABLE 8. PERCENTAGE TURNOVER OF AGENCY ELITES
25 This does not mean these agencies are not at times "captured" by the industry, only that
capture is not positively related to the age of the agency. The charge of capture has
been documented by others (see footnote 5), and this paper does not challenge those
findings.
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TABLE 9. PERCENTAGE OF AGENCY ELITES WITH PRIOR EXPERTISE AT TIME OF APPOINTMENT
Table 9 presents the percentage of agency elites with prior expertise in regula-
tion or the substantive area being regulated. The only thing that can be said for
expertise is that it does not co-vary with the age of the agency. Expertise fluctuates
moderately in some agencies and more so in others such as the FTC. In general
these agencies reflect the high value placed on expertise with the more recently
created agencies (PSA, NTSB, and OSHA) ranking very high from their inception.
Although the correlations within agencies (Table 14) show four of the five relation-
ships are positive (a rejection of Bernstein), most relationships are too small for
certainty.
Table 10 presents the average age of the agency elites over time. The most
notable fact is that the age of agency executives varies little. Table 14, however,
shows that as agencies age, the average age of their executives increases. Although
an upper limit to executive ages must dampen this trend eventually, the prediction
of a positive relationship appears to hold.
TABLE 10. AVERAGE AGE OF AGENCY ELITES
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Our theory predicts that as agencies age, their procedures will become more
judicialized resulting in increased backlogs and a decline in efficiency. The next
three tables examine these predictions. The relationship between legal training of
agency elites and the age of the agency forms a consistent pattern. Although some
fluctuation exists, regulatory agencies appear to include more lawyers as they age
(Table 11). Table 14 reveals that this relationship holds for all agencies except
the NTSB. Despite the one exception the data indicate that as regulatory agencies
age, lawyers are more likely to be in positions of authority.
TABLE 11. PERCENTAGE OF AGENCY ELITES WITH LEGAL TRAINING
When the backlog of an agency is defined as the number of cases pending at
the end of the year divided by the total number of cases processed, backlogs appear
to be unrelated to agency age (Table 12). Only the National Transportation Society
Board is faced with a constantly growing backlog. Although the backlog for each
agency is a large percentage of disposed cases indicating the agencies’ procedures
are fairly slow, the backlogs in general do not show the predicted increasing trend.
TABLE 12. AGENCY EACKLOGS - PERCENTAGE OF CASES PENDING AT END OF YEAR
* Data not a~-ailable.
fi Agency redefines its workload.
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TABLE 13. AGENCY EFFICIENCY RATIOS (WORKLOAD DIVIDED BY PERSONNEL)
* Data not available.
Agency redefines its workload.
Neither, according to Table 13, does agency efficiency decline with age. Because
agency efficiency is defined as the number of cases processed divided by the number
of full time personnel, however, the figures in Table 13 should be viewed with some
skepticism. First, the demand for agency services is totally outside the control of
these agencies; this fact accounts for the increased efficiency of the NLRB after
World War II when a large number of war-delayed cases hit the Board. The
figures may not reflect, therefore, the agency’s capacity but rather the demands on
it. Second, agencies from time to time change their definition of their outputs mak-
TABLE 14. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN AGENCY AGE AND SELECTED DEPENDENT VARIABLES
if Data insufficient to calculate correlations.
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ing comparisons within agencies difficult.26 Despite these limitations only the FTC
and the FAA show a decline in agency &dquo;efficiency.&dquo; In both cases the agency re-
defined their workloads and reported a smaller portion of their activities making
this support of the theory’s predictions highly questionable.
CONCLUSIONS
Three hypotheses derived from Bernstein’s theory of regulatory agency decay
were tested. Diffuse political support, as predicted, is negatively related to agency
age; but this is because new agencies’ support drops off rapidly. After the first few
years diffuse support has no relationship with an agency’s age. The relationship
between the industry and the agency also fails to conform to the prediction. The
interchange of personnel between agency and industry actually declines with time.
Public statements of interest group support do increase with time, but the relation-
ship is slight.
The key aspect of Bernstein’s theory is the relationship between rigidity and
age. This study found that as an agency aged, the average age of its executives
increased and more of the executives had legal training. Contrary to predictions,
however, aging agencies do not have increased turnover, decreased expertise, in-
creased backlogs, or decreased efficiency. Clearly age is not fundamental to the
decline of regulatory agencies.
Based on the results presented above, the future does not look bright for an
aging theory of regulatory agency decay. The results contradict the predictions as
often as they confirm them. Faced with such negative and random results, should
Bernstein’s theory of regulatory agency decay be firmly rejected? We think not.
This initial analysis only tested the relationship between agency age and the other
three variables. It did not probe the relationship between political support and
rigidity, between the interest relationship and rigidity, or between political support
and the interest relationship. These relationships remain untested. We feel that
the model should be revised to keep those aspects that appear plausible and elim-
inate those that do not. By deleting the age variable and retaining political support,
the agency-industry relationship, and agency rigidity, an altered, yet to be tested,
model is created. Such a model has an advantage over the initial model in that it
allows for a reversal of the decay process when the environment makes certain
demands on the agency. This appears plausible in light of recent activity by older
agencies such as the FTC. In addition, this model places the causes of rigidity
directly with the political environment facing the agency and does not rely on the
more difficult life cycle analogy, a position supported by much of organization
theory. The model shows enough promise to merit some further empirical testing.
26 Comparisons across agencies are, of course, impossible because the functions agency’s per-
form are significantly different. This paper has consistently compared only data within
agencies where the data is comparable.
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